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NOTES
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY UNDER CONTINGENT
PLEA AGREEMENTS
In a criminal case the prosecutor will often make a plea agree-
ment with an accomplice of the defendant. Under these tradition-
ally sanctioned agreements the accomplice receives a reduced
sentence in return for full and truthful testimony during the defend-
ant's trial. In recent years, some prosecutors have further condi-
tioned the accomplice's reduction in sentence upon the defendant's
indictment or conviction or the prosecutor's satisfaction with the ac-
complice's testimony.
This Note addresses whether testimony made pursuant to such
contingent plea agreements is so unreliable that courts should ex-
clude the testimony from evidence. This Note begins with a histori-
cal background of accomplice plea agreements and discusses the
due process doctrine used to analyze the constitutionality of such
agreements. It then examines recent developments involving con-
tingent accomplice plea agreements. Finally, it concludes that
courts should prohibit contingent accomplice plea agreements
based upon defendants' due process rights and courts' supervisory
powers to reject unreliable evidence.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The History of Accomplice Plea Agreements
The long history of prosecutorial leniency in return for accom-
plice testimony has led to its widespread acceptance. Although
courts recognize that accomplice plea agreements may encourage
perjury, they deem that the value of the information obtained
through such agreements outweighs the danger of unreliability.
1. At Common Law
Common law courts have sanctioned the practice of plea bar-
gaining for centuries. At early common law, English courts consid-
ered accomplices competent accusers in felony cases and either
pardoned the accomplice upon the defendant's conviction or exe-
cuted the accomplice upon the defendant's acquittal.' This practice
1 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *235.
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fell into disuse because the likelihood of perjury by the accomplice
was thought to outweigh the probative value of his testimony. 2 To
encourage accomplice testimony, however, the practice of granting
pardons for "turning king's evidence" later evolved. 3 The Ameri-
can criminal justice system expanded the English tradition by
allowing bargains for leniency as well as for immunity from
prosecution.4
2. In Current American Jurisprudence
Currently, about ninety percent of all criminal defendants plead
guilty,5 and an unknown but substantial percentage of these defend-
ants agree to testify against their co-defendants or co-conspirators
in return for prosecutorial leniency.6 If the accomplice does not tes-
tify fully and truthfully, the prosecutor may refuse the leniency
promised in the bargain. Courts sanction these "traditional" ac-
complice plea agreements7 and recognize them as a proper exercise
of prosecutorial authority.8
2 Id. at *226.
3 Id. at *304; see, e.g., Rex v. Brunton, 168 Eng. Rep. 894 (K.B. 1821) (sheep stealer
turns king's evidence on burglary indictment); The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160
(K.B. 1775) (bond forger testifies for crown).
4 E.g., State v. Riney, 137 Mo. 102, 104-05, 38 S.W. 718, 718-19 (1897) (accom-
plice's belief that his testimony would result in lighter sentence did not make him incom-
petent witness); State v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 89, 55 P. 919, 926 (1899) (accomplice
witness "is not rendered incompetent by reason of any immunity offered").
5 J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.02, at 2 (1975); H. MILLER, W.
McDONALD &J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1978); see also U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STA-
TIsTICs-1985, at 479 (T. Flanagan & E. McGarrell eds. 1986) (table 5.20) (69.8% of
criminal defendants brought before United States district courts in year endingJune 30,
1984, pleaded guilty).
6 J. BOND, supra note 5, § 1.08; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 829 (S.
Kadish ed. 1983); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174
(1958) (defendant testified as prosecution witness in other cases with expectation of rec-
ommendation of concurrent sentences).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Boley, 730 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Tiche, 424 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
939 (1976); see also A.B.A., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.9(b)(vi) (1974) (prosecutor may decline to
prosecute accused based on accused's cooperation in apprehension and conviction of
others).
The Constitution places some limits upon a prosecutor's discretion regarding plea
agreements. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). Generally, prosecutors
must uphold the proper standards of fairness and justice. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971). In the context of plea agreements, this standard requires that
prosecutors disclose all agreements to the defendant, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 153-55 (1972), and uphold the terms of the agreement if the accomplice testifies
truthfully under the agreement. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261. Prosecutors must use fair
procedures rather than merely advocate conviction. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).
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Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable testi-
mony because they create an incentive for the accomplice to shift
blame to the defendant or other co-conspirators. Further, an accom-
plice may wish to please the prosecutor to ensure lenient prosecu-
tion in his own case. Nevertheless, courts have held that the
testimony of accomplices who receive lenient treatment is not per se
unreliable. 9 Federal courts have allowed convictions based on un-
corroborated testimony of accomplices to stand where the testi-
mony is not "incredible or unsubstantial on its face."10 Convictions
have been sustained even when the accomplice is an admitted
perjurer."
Courts may deem accomplice testimony incompetent if the plea
agreement departs from the traditional agreement to testify truth-
fully.1 2 A number of state courts have censured bargains condi-
tioned upon a witness's agreement to testify in a particular manner
and have overturned the resulting convictions on both due process
and policy grounds.' 3 Courts prohibit these agreements because
they provide a virtually irresistible temptation for the witness to say
whatever will satisfy the prosecution.
9 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); Benson v. United States,
146 U.S. 325, 334 (1892); United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1300 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 168 (1986); United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981), 1156 (1982); see also Darden v. United States, 405 F.2d
1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1969) (plea bargaining between prosecutor and co-defendant does
not amount to coerced testimony against defendant); Minkin v. United States, 383 F.2d
427, 428 (9th Cir. 1967) (same).
10 See, e.g., Haakinson v. United States, 238 F.2d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1956) and cases
cited therein.
11 See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918); United States v. Miceli, 446
F.2d 256, 258-59 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Margolis, 138 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d
Cir. 1943); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 643-44 (E.D. Pa. 1965); United
States v. Segelman, 83 F. Supp. 890, 892-93 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
12 See infra note 13; see also Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Conditional Promise of Im-
munity, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 138, 140 (1952).
13 People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438,455, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 145 (1974) ("[A]
defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon ac-
complice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or
the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion."); People v.
Green, 102 Cal. App. 2d 831, 839, 228 P.2d 867, 871 (1951) ("miscarriage ofjustice"
caused by state's use of testimony which was tainted beyond redemption because of
condition upon which immunity depended); State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 626, 13 S.W.
832, 838 (1890) ("I do not believe that such a bargain as this to testify against the life of
another should receive any countenance or sanction in a court ofjustice .... ") (emphasis
added); Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 223-24, 577 P.2d 860, 862 (1978) ("[I]f the cir-
cumstances of the plea bargain would reasonably cause the alleged accomplice to be-
lieve he must testify in a particular fashion, then a less explicit arrangement also violates
the defendant's due process rights."); Harris v. State, 15 Tex. Crim. 629, 634 (1883) ("A
witness thus situated by the terms of the contract and the pendency of the indictment
would, we believe, swear any and all things.... [W]e ... will not sustain a conviction
obtained in such manner.").
[Vol. 72:800802
CONTINGENT PLEA AGREEMENTS
Until recently, at least two federal courts concurred in this anal-
ysis and implied that testimony made pursuant to contingent agree-
ments should be excluded from evidence. 14 Other federal and state
courts, however, admit the testimony of accomplices who are sen-
tenced after testifying under traditional agreements. 15 Although a
delayed sentence is not explicitly contingent upon the testimony's
content, similar reasoning applies to both delayed sentences and
contingent agreements. In both cases, the accomplice's perception
of what the government wants to hear will affect his testimony. In
this respect, the courts have treated delayed sentencing and contin-
gent agreements inconsistently.
B. The Standards of Procedural Due Process
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution require fair procedures in state and federal courts.
Although the Supreme Court has used various factors to determine
the exact requirements of procedural due process, the concept of
fundamental fairness is a constant theme. The Court has upheld
accomplice plea bargains as constitutional; however, the exact limi-
tations upon prosecutorial discretion with respect to these agree-
ments remains unclear.
1. The Doctrine
Due process guarantees defendants a right to fair procedure
and has traditionally operated to exclude involuntary confessions 16
and unreliable witness testimony. 17 Such exclusions are particularly
14 See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981) (possibly im-
proper to invite witness to believe agreement contingent upon government's satisfaction
with testimony), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d
1228, 1230 (8th Cir.) (An immunity agreement entered with an accomplice (Fowler) did
not constitute unfair prosecutorial conduct because "[t]he agreement was made and
binding upon the government before Fowler testified; it was not contingent upon the
government's satisfaction with the content of the testimony. Fowler could testify truth-
fully and fully pursuant to the agreement without fear of reprisal."), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
939 (1976).
15 E.g., United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 910 (1967); People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 265-66, 324 P.2d 556, 566-67
(1958) (en banc); State v. Harper, 713 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
16 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (questioning of seriously
wounded defendant in intensive care and transcription of defendant's written answers
resulted in unreliable and involuntary statements); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) (confession resulting from impermissible police methods involuntary and un-
trustworthy); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (same).
17 See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (unduly suggestive police pro-
cedures in obtaining witness identification of suspect may result in testimony so unrelia-
ble that it violates due process rights of defendant); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
(1969) (same).
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necessary when customary methods of exposing unreliability, such
as cross-examination, impeachment, and the jurors' evaluation of
credibility, cannot adequately safeguard a defendant's interest in be-
ing tried upon reliable evidence.18
Under current doctrine, the Supreme Court generally considers
four factors important in determining the requirements of proce-
dural due process for a criminal trial: whether the questioned proce-
dure threatens the reliability of the fact-finding process,' 9 whether
the practice has been historically accepted, 20 whether a per se con-
stitutional prohibition should be imposed, 2' and the administrative
costs of any prohibition.22 The Court has fluctuated as to which fac-
tors it should assess in a particular case and the weight that it should
accord each factor; some cases concentrate on the reliability of evi-
dence obtained by questioned procedures and others give more im-
portance to historical or administrative considerations. 23
a. Reliability of the Fact-Finding Process
Some courts give high priority to due process rights that further
the goal of accuracy in the fact-finding process. For example, the
Supreme Court excludes involuntary confessions as unreliable
18 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 174, at 496-97 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984) (context of suggestive line-ups). This rule clearly extends to matters dealing with
a witness's credibility. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (Ist Cir.) (coerced testi-
mony of witnesses is unreliable and should be excluded), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080
(1974); see infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (explaining why jurors cannot accu-
rately weigh testimony given under contingent agreements).
19 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (claim of illegal search and
seizure different from most other claims because application of exclusionary rule de-
flects truth-finding process); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring) (unlike claim of denial of effective counsel, claim of illegal search
and seizure does not impugn integrity of fact-finding process).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (historical acceptance of
warrantless arrests); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (tradition that grand
jury may consider evidence inadmissible at trial).
21 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (to avoid involuntary confes-
sion, police must recite suspect's rights before interrogation); Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 125 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (per se rule would discourage use of
unreliable investigatory methods).
22 See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (costs should be consid-
ered in determining if particular type of search is unreasonable under fourth amend-
ment); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (same).
Professors LaFave and Israel suggest that these four factors are the most important
and consistently applied measures that the Supreme Court has used in assessing proce-
dural due process in a criminal context. 1 W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 2.8, at 109 (1984).
23 Id.; see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (reliability of fact-finding accu-
racy given higher priority than other due process interests); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971) (administrative costs emphasized in holding that plea bargaining per-
missible); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (grand jury may consider evi-
dence inadmissible at trial because such consideration is historically accepted).
[Vol. 72:800
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evidence. 24 Similarly, a prosecutor cannot attempt to use a defend-
ant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings for
impeachment. 25
In cases concerning police procedures for witness identification
of suspects, 26 the Court has voiced the concern that juries not hear
the testimony unless the evidence has "aspects of reliability." 27
Judges must assess the totality of the circumstances when deciding
whether the procedures used are so "unnecessarily suggestive" that
they deny the defendant due process.28 "[R]eliability is the linchpin
in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." '29
Because disallowing certain pretrial practices greatly increases
the reliability of the evidence offered, the prohibition of these prac-
tices enhances the fairness of the trial process. In Foster v. Califor-
nia,30 for example, the Supreme Court excluded identification
testimony because the police procedure used in obtaining the iden-
tification rendered the testimony unreliable. In Foster, the only wit-
ness to an armed robbery viewed a three-man line-up, and when the
witness could not positively identify the defendant the police ar-
ranged a one-to-one meeting. Even after this confrontation, how-
ever, the witness was unsure of the identification, so one week later
the police arranged a second line-up of five men in which the de-
fendant was the only man from the first line-up to appear. This time
the witness identified the defendant.3 ' The Court held that the ele-
ments of the identification procedure made it inevitable that the wit-
ness would testify as he did. Because the pretrial procedure was
"unnecessarily suggestive," it undermined the reliability of the wit-
ness's testimony and admission of the testimony violated due
process.32
b. Historical Acceptance
The Supreme Court has noted that historical acceptance of a
24 See cases cited supra note 16.
25 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) ("Silence in the wake of [Miranda]
warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of [his) Miranda rights....
[Ilt would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the ar-
rested person's silence to be used to impeach .... ").
26 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972);
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
27 Manson, 432 U.S. at 112.
28 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; see also Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 274 (admitting such testimony
would "seriously aggravate whatever derogation exists of the accused's right to a fair
trial").
29 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
30 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
31 Id. at 441-42.
32 Id. at 442-43.
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procedure supports the validity of its use.3 3 In Costello v. United
States,34 for example, the Court permitted a grand jury to consider
testimony inadmissible at trial.3 5 The Court stated that grand jurors
historically have great latitude in weighing all available information
to determine whether to bring an indictment.3 6 The Court there-
fore refused to quash the indictment on the grounds that it was sup-
ported by unreliable evidence.
c. Desirability of a Per Se Rule
In some instances the Supreme Court has favored rulings tai-
lored to specific cases and particular circumstances, recognizing
that, despite unorthodox procedures, reliable evidence should not
be excluded. At other times, the Court has adopted broader per se
prohibitions because they provide more guidance to courts and law
enforcement agencies.3 7 Blanket prohibitions have the advantage of
preventing lower courts from readily evading case-by-case standards
through opaque and intricate rulings that merely reflect the courts'
individual values.38 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
certain guarantees require absolute protection without regard to a
33 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (historical acceptance of war-
rantless arrests); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretion-
ary state appeals or petitions for certiorari to Supreme Court because consistent policy
that counsel not needed); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (viewed from
historical perspective federal courts have power to punish for criminal contempt without
indictment or jury trial), overruled, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (upholding tradition that grand jury may consider
evidence inadmissible at trial).
TheJustices, however, have somewhat modified this stance when interpreting guar-
antees that arguably were intended to be in accord with the views of contemporary soci-
ety. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 620 (1949)
(RutledgeJ., concurring) ("[O]ur Constitution today would be very different from what
it is if such a narrow and literal construction of each of its terms had been transmuted
into an inflexible rule of constitutional interpretation."); see also 1 W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL,
supra note 22, at 111 (Justices generally agree that historical acceptance has less signifi-
cance in interpreting "open-ended" guarantees); Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U.
PA. L. REV. 639, 660 (1926) (arguably, due process clause was intended to be "moulded
to the views of contemporary society").
34 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
35 Id. at 363.
36 Id. at 362.
37 The Court's treatment of the admissibility of confessions in fifth amendment
cases illustrates the difficulties encountered in developing case-by-case standards. Even-
tually, the Court turned to an application of per se requirements in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 114 n.21. See generally
Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 518, 535 (change in Court's treatment of search and seizure cases).
38 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 114 & n.23 (citing Amsterdam, The
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (1970) and
Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 Sup. CT. REV.
155, as articles supporting view that Court is concerned with lower courts' insensitivity
to constitutional claims, especially where guilt is clear).
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case-by-case balancing of reliability.3 9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that courts
must decide the constitutionality of witness identification proce-
dures on a case-by-case basis.40 The Court refused to apply per se
prohibitions against suggestive witness identification procedures
because they can prove reliable and necessary under certain
circumstances. 41
d. Administrative Costs
Expansive due process standards often impose a substantial
burden on the administration of the criminal justice system. These
costs include increased expenses,42 additional hearings, 43 and ob-
stacles to criminal punishment. 44 Because the Supreme Court has
given varying weight to CoStS, 4 5 debate continues regarding the ex-
tent to which the Court should consider the practical effects of its
constitutional decisions. 46 Nevertheless, there is a consensus that
the Court should consider administrative costs only where a sub-
39 The fifth amendment right to freedom from self-incrimination, for example, re-
ceives absolute protection. See, e.g., NewJersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).
40 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
41 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1968) (identification of sus-
pect by five bank employees day after robbery from group snapshots was reliable
enough to be admitted); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (confrontation and iden-
tification of accused in hospital did not violate due process when no one knew how long
hospitalized witness would live).
42 See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (indigent defendant has
right to free record of proceeding in misdemeanor appeals); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendants entitled to appointed counsel at trial).
43 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (requirement of preliminary
hearing in parole reevaluation proceedings).
44 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of fourth amendment will undoubtedly allow some criminals to go free).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (damage to institution of
grand jury caused by invoking fourth amendment exclusionary rule outweighs incre-
mental detrimental effect on police behavior); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 471 (1972) (no dis-
cussion of costs of new requirement of preliminary hearing in parole reevaluation
proceedings); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (plea bargaining should
be encouraged because it conserves judicial resources).
46 See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (Court cannot
balance state's fiscal interest against defendant's need to have transcript for appeal be-
cause state interest is irrelevant); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Court
should not consider administrative costs when interpreting Constitution); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112-13 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(same); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (costs of
providing counsel for indigent defendants in cases which do not involve imprisonment
are "irrelevant and speculative"); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (assistance of counsel upon appeal puts too great burden on state
judicial machinery). The Court has stated that if the constitutional command is unequiv-
ocal, costs are irrelevant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980). Fourth amend-
ment cases, however, frequently discuss the practical costs of particular rulings. See, e.g.,
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-22 (1981) (costs of requiring search war-
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stantial burden on the criminal justice system exists. 4 7
2. The Procedural Due Process of Accomplice Plea Agreements
Until recently, few courts had directly analyzed the procedural
due process implications of accomplice plea bargaining. In Lisenba
v. California48 the Supreme Court held that a traditional agreement
of prosecutorial leniency in return for accomplice testimony did not
violate the due process rights of the defendant. Like most courts,
however, the Supreme Court has recognized that accomplice agree-
ments may encourage perjured testimony.49 Despite this realiza-
tion, many courts have held that the terms of accomplice plea
agreements merely affect the weight of the testimony, not its admis-
sibility. 50 These courts have determined that mandatory disclosure
of the terms of the agreements and defense attorneys' cross-exami-
nations sufficiently expose incentives to lie so that jurors can prop-
erly weigh witnesses' credibility.
Courts have carved out one exception to the theory that accom-
plice agreements affect only the weight of the testimony. This ex-
ception applies when the prosecution interferes with a defense
witness's free and unhampered decision to testify. If the prosecutor
influences the witness to testify for the prosecution instead of the
defense or interferes with the content of his testimony for the de-
fense, some courts will find a violation of the defendant's due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. 5 ' When such a due process violation occurs,
an appellate court must reverse the lower court's conviction without
regard to the actual prejudice to the defendant.52
rant before entering home); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316-22 (1978)
(costs of requiring warrant to inspect work areas).
47 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (costs of providing indigent defend-
ants with counsel in cases not involving imprisonment outweigh the benefits); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) (warnings against self-incrimination do not sub-
stantially interfere with efficient administration of criminal justice system).
48 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941).
49 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967); see supra notes 13-14 and ac-
companying text.
50 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 2488 (1987); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1257 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 772 (6th Cir.
1977); United States v. Borman, 437 F.2d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913
(1971). For an argument contra, see infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
51 United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983); United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Henricksen, 564 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d
334, 336 (6th Cir. 1973).
52 United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCOMPLICE PLEA BARGAINING
In recent years, several federal courts have tried cases involving
contingent plea agreements between prosecutors and accomplices.
In these cases, the accomplice pleaded guilty and agreed to testify
against the defendant in return for a reduction in sentence. The
deals, however, were contingent upon either success in obtaining
further indictments53 or the value to the prosecution of the testi-
mony or information provided. 54 The defendants argued that
under these circumstances witnesses will go to any length, including
perjury, to obtain the benefits of their bargain. The defendants
claimed that such governmental encouragement of perjury violates
the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.55
In 1985, the Eighth Circuit addressed these issues in United
States v. Waterman.56 In Waterman, the prosecution's witness, Eugene
Gamst, pleaded guilty and agreed to testify before a grand jury. He
was promised a two-year reduction in sentence if the grand jury
handed down more indictments, and was told that the appropriate
authorities would be informed if he cooperated at trial.57 After re-
ceiving a ten-year sentence, Waterman questioned the constitution-
ality of the agreement,58 claiming that the agreement encouraged
perjury at trial to an extent that cross-examination could not rectify.
Although other evidence buttressed the reliability of Gamst's testi-
mony, an Eighth Circuit panel held that Gamst's testimony violated
Waterman's due process rights because the government offered
favorable treatment to Gamst contingent upon the outcome of his
testimony.59 Upon rehearing en banc, however, the evenly divided
Eighth Circuit vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district
court's determination that the contingent agreement did not violate
due process.60
53 United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1528 (1984), vacated en banc, No. 83-
2159 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); United States v. Baresh,
595 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
54 United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 876
(1987); United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dailey,
759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985).
55 Spector, 793 F.2d at 936; Fallon, 776 F.2d at 732; Dailey, 759 F.2d at 194; Water-
man, 732 F.2d at 1530; Baresh, 595 F. Supp. at 1133.
56 732 F.2d 1527 (1984), vacated en banc, No. 83-2159 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
57 732 F.2d at 1529 nn.1 & 2.
58 Id. at 1530. Although Waterman questioned the agreement itself, clearly the use
of the resulting testimony at trial was the act that violated his due process rights.
59 Id. at 1531.
60 Id. at 1533. One of the three panel judges, ChiefJudge Lay, did not participate
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Deciding a similar issue in United States v. Dailey,6' a Massachu-
setts district court held the admission of accomplice testimony un-
constitutional, relying in part on the reasoning of the three-judge
panel in Waterman.62 By the time the First Circuit heard Dailey on
appeal, the Eighth Circuit had vacated the Waterman panel opin-
ion.63 The First Circuit nevertheless distinguished the panel opin-
ion 64 when it vacated the district court's ruling.65
The defendant in Dailey argued that the contingent accomplice
agreements violated his due process rights because the agreements
required more than full and truthful testimony. Two of the three
agreements contained a promise for full cooperation in return for a
recommendation of a sentence not to exceed twenty years. 66 Fur-
thermore, depending upon the value of the witnesses' testimony,
the prosecution could recommend a sentence of only ten years. 67
The agreement with the third witness consisted of a four-month stay
of sentencing, the possibility of a further stay, and the potential for
government support on a motion for sentence reduction. 68 These
last two benefits depended upon the value or "benefit" of the infor-
mation to the government as determined by the prosecutor.69 The
district court noted that the agreements required more than full co-
operation by the witnesses because otherwise the provisions con-
in the en banc vote because of illness. If he had voted and maintained his former posi-
tion, the lower court would have been reversed.
61 589 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1984).
62 Id. at 563-64. The district court decided Dailey prior to the reconsideration of
Waterman en banc.
After the district court's decision in Dailey, the Maine district court decided United
States v. Kenney, 598 F. Supp. 874 (D. Me. 1984). In Kenney, an accomplice plea agree-
ment required "actively assisting law enforcement officials in procuring the arrest and
subsequent conviction of his associates." Id. at 878. Because Waterman had not yet been
vacated en banc and Dailey had not yet been vacated on appeal, the court distinguished
Kenney from these cases in upholding the agreement. The court stated that the contin-
gency in Kenney depended upon the accomplice taking an active part in making drug
buys and recording telephone conversations rather than procuring the arrest per se. Id.
at 880. Furthermore, the court stated that the insistence upon truthful testimony in the
agreement removed any incentive to fabricate. Id. at 879.
63 Waterman was decided on May 2, 1984 and vacated on September 20, 1984. 732
F.2d at 1527. Dailey was decided June 22, 1984, 589 F. Supp. at 561, and vacated on
April 5, 1985. 759 F.2d at 192.
64 Id. at 196-98.
65 Id. at 201. The distinction that the First Circuit deemed important was that the
Dailey agreements were dependent upon an indefinite standard, i.e., testimony that was
valuable to the prosecutidn. Id. at 197. Because the agreements in Waterman were con-
ditioned upon further indictments, the First Circuit found that although these agree-
ments were perhaps impermissibly premised upon successful prosecution, the Dailey
agreements were not. Id.
66 Id. at 194.
67 Id
68 Id at 195-96.
69 Id. at 196. For the text of this agreement, see 589 F. Supp. at 565-66.
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cerning the ten-year sentences and the further stay of sentencing
would be superfluous. 70 Therefore, the district court concluded
that the prosecutor provided the witnesses with incentives to lie by
conditioning further rewards upon the government's satisfaction. 7'
The First Circuit disagreed with this analysis and concluded
that the agreements did not encourage perjury to an unconstitu-
tional degree. The court viewed the leniency available under the
agreements as independent from the prosecution's success. 72 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the government had established a
legitimate interest in making the plea bargain contingent. Because
the first two witnesses were suspected of being major drug import-
ers with many connections, the prosecution could encourage full co-
operation more effectively by using contingent agreements. 73 The
First Circuit regarded these circumstances as "fairly compelling rea-
sons for having made these plea agreements somewhat open-
ended,"' 74 implying that the governmental interest in the agree-
ments outweighed the possible harm of perjured testimony. The
court concluded that the requirements of due process were satisfied,
and the testimony was admitted.75
The First Circuit relied in part on United States v. Kimble76 in
refusing to exclude the testimony of the witnesses. 77 In Kimble, an
accomplice pleaded guilty and agreed to testify in return for a
twenty-year sentence conditioned upon "the acceptance of the ade-
quacy of his cooperation. ' 78 Although the witness acknowledged
that he had repeatedly committed perjury on previous occasions,
the court decided that the agreement did not put impermissible
pressure upon the witness to lie again. The court held that the
agreement should only affect the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. 79
70 Id. at 563.
71 Id. at 564.
72 Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197.
73 Id.
74 Id
75 Id. at 200. The First Circuit vacated the district court's pre-trial order barring
the three accomplices' testimony and remanded to the District of Massachusetts for fur-
ther proceedings. Id. at 201.
In United States v. Silvestri, 790 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 197
(1986), the defendants urged the court to reconsider its holding in Dailey because sev-
eral witnesses in Silvestri testified under the same plea agreement used in Dailey. The
First Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments for the same reasons set forth in Daiey.
790 F.2d at 188 n.l.
76 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
77 Dailey, 759 F.2d at 198-99.
78 Kimble, 719 F.2d at 1255.
79 Id. at 1256-57. Kimble can be distinguished from Dailey, however, because the
Kimble agreement did not necessarily encourage biased or perjured testimony. The
twenty year sentence recommendation in Kimble was not contingent upon the value of
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In the aftermath of Waterman and Dailey, two circuit court cases
have found contingent plea agreements constitutional. In United
States v. Fallon80 the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutor could
condition the charges brought against a co-conspirator upon the
level of his cooperation at the defendant's trial. The agreement fur-
ther stated that "if the level of cooperation would materialize as rep-
resented, . . . the government would, at the time of sentencing,
recommend that the client not be incarcerated" and that the prose-
cution would "be in the best posture to evaluate the witness' ef-
forts" after trial.81 In United States v. Spector8 2 the Eighth Circuit
upheld a similar agreement contingent upon cooperation in "solv-
ing and prosecuting crimes." Both courts noted the cases' factual
similarity to Dailey and found its reasoning persuasive.8 3 Limiting
instructions to the jury, impeachment, and cross-examination were
deemed procedurally adequate to safeguard against any dangers to
due process.8 4
United States v. Bareshs5 is the only recent case in which a federal
court deemed a plea bargain agreement so conducive to perjury that
it tainted the testimony beyond any possibility of redemption.8 6 In
Baresh, the contingent plea agreement provided the witness with a
pardon and permission to keep assets obtained with his narcotics
profits if his testimony led to the arrest and indictment of two speci-
fied defendants. If the testimony did not lead to arrest and indict-
ment, however, the witness probably would receive a fifteen-year
sentence even if he told the full truth.8 7 The district court for the
Southern District of Texas concluded that the witness's devastating
and totally uncorroborated testimony against a defendant whom the
government had originally doubted it could indict was so unreliable
that its admission violated the defendant's due process rights.88
the testimony to one party, as in Dailey, but merely upon the "adequacy" of the testi-
mony. The witness's previous record may have encouraged the prosecution to condi-
tion the sentence in this manner to encourage truthful, rather than perjured, testimony.
80 776 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1985).
81 Id.
82 793 F.2d 932, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 876 (1987).
83 776 F.2d at 733-34; 793 F.2d at 937.
84 776 F.2d at 734; 793 F.2d at 937.
85 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
86 United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1299-1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 168 (1986), distinguished Baresh, Dailey, and Waterman in deciding that no contingent
plea agreement, and therefore no due process violation, existed.
87 595 F. Supp. at 1134 n.2.





The Constitution guarantees that the government may not im-
prison a person except in accordance with fair procedures. 89
Prosecutorial use of outcome-oriented agreements to obtain
favorable testimony exceeds the parameters of fair criminal proce-
dure. Defendants lack comparable bargaining leverage that would
enable them to elicit similarly favorable testimony from witnesses.
Prosecutors, whose duty is to seek justice rather than convictions, 90
should not place the desire for convictions ahead of the pursuit of
unbiased testimony. Buying testimony with conditional leniency
tips the scales of justice by inviting perjury.
Two factors support the prohibition of contingent plea agree-
ments. First, the admission of testimony obtained by contingent
plea agreements violates the defendant's due process rights. Be-
cause contingent plea agreements encourage embellishment or
fabrication, the resulting testimony is not reliable. The Supreme
Court has stated that due process requires the exclusion of patently
unreliable testimony. Other factors used to assess due process im-
plications, such as administrative burdens and historical acceptance,
also indicate that using contingent plea agreements violates the de-
fendant's due process rights.
Second, courts should disallow these agreements under their
inherent supervisory powers to require reliable evidence and to up-
hold fair procedural standards at trial. The exclusion of testimony
induced by contingent agreements maintains a minimal level of ac-
curacy in admitted evidence because the witness's overwhelming in-
centives to lie frustrate the effectiveness of cross-examination. The
goals of deterring prosecutorial overreaching and upholding judi-
cial integrity also provide grounds for the exclusion of testimony
made under contingent plea agreements. The judicial duty to en-
sure a fair trial mandates the prohibition of prosecutorial practices
which border on the bribery of witnesses.
89 The fifth amendment's guarantee of due process requires fair procedures at trial.
See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (admission of unreliable testimony
regarding identification of suspect made pursuant to suggestive police procedures vio-
lates due process); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (same). Like the due process
clause, the sixth amendment requires fair conduct and procedures at trial. However, the
concerns of the sixth amendment are generally limited to the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury, the right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
and confront government witnesses, and the right to assistance of counsel and compul-
sory process. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (indigent's right to free
transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indi-
gent's right to appointed counsel on first appeal).
90 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); A.B.A., supra note 8, § 1.1(c).
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A. Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court has traditionally considered four factors
when assessing a criminal defendant's due process right to a fair
trial.91 An analysis of these factors indicates that the use of testi-
mony made under contingent plea agreements is unconstitutional.
1. Reliability of the Fact-Finding Process
The principles illustrated by Foster v. California,92 where the
Court excluded identification testimony because the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure undermined its reliability, apply to
contingent plea agreements. Bargains conditioned upon the prose-
cution's satisfaction with a witness's testimony are more than "un-
necessarily suggestive." In effect, they demand rather than suggest
that witnesses testify in certain ways in order to receive the agree-
ment's benefits. 93 These agreements constitute a far more persua-
sive suggestion than improper line-up procedures, however,
because the suggestion inherent in a contingent agreement is cou-
91 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
92 394 U.S. 440 (1969); see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
93 Even absent contingent rewards, courts recognize that accomplices have a great
interest in lying in favor of the government: "To think that criminals will lie to save their
fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe
the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at
large." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
A traditional plea agreement already contains a great incentive for the accomplice
to testify with the aim of pleasing the prosecutor. Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977); see also Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23
(allowing accused accomplice to testify for prosecution creates great incentive for per-
jury); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[P]romises of
immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong
inducement to falsify in that case."); DuBose v. LeFevre, 619 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir.
1980) (agreements in general terms create an incentive on witness's part to testify favor-
ably for state); Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to
Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887, 890 (1981) ("[P]romises of favorable
treatment directly premised on 'cooperative' testimony create a clear incentive for falsifi-
cation.").
In an agreement premised solely upon indictment, conviction, or the prosecutor's
satisfaction with the witness's testimony, that incentive becomes virtually irresistible. See
United States v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (agreement contin-
gent upon indictments "placed far more stress upon [witness's] veracity (though but-
tressed by the government's requirement of truthfulness) than its gossamer frailness
could withstand"); United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 602 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(credibility of witness is more suspect when he believes that leniency is contingent upon
his testimony), aff'd, 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Peo-
ple v. Green, 102 Cal. App. 2d 831, 838-39, 228 P.2d 867, 871-72 (1951) (agreement
premised upon conviction of defendant resulted in unfair trial); Note, supra note 12, at
140 ("Judicial censure of bargains conditioned upon effective prosecution of the defend-
ant stems from a feeling that they exert so great a pressure upon a witness to perjure
himself that a conviction based on such testimony cannot be upheld.").
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pled with significant rewards to the witness. 94 The likelihood of un-
reliability is therefore much greater when incarceration is at stake.
Such reward-induced testimony thus falls within the category of evi-
dence which is so unreliable that its admission violates the defend-
ant's due process rights. As the panel in the Waterman decision
stated, there is "no place in due process law for positioning the jury
to weed out the seeds of untruth planted by the government." 95
2. Historical Acceptance
The Supreme Court has suggested that historical acceptance of
certain procedures creates a strong presumption of constitutional-
ity.96 Contingent agreements, however, historically have not been
accepted. Before Waterman and Dailey, no federal court had held
that contingent plea agreements satisfy the requirements of due
process. Indeed, no federal case had addressed the question. Simi-
larly, before 1984, no state court had upheld the use of such agree-
ments to procure testimony at trial. 97 Thus, considering the short
history of acceptance of contingent plea agreements, the "historical
acceptance" factor lends no support to the practice of conditioning
a lenient sentence upon satisfactory accomplice testimony. This is
particularly true considering society's increased concern within the
past century for fair trial procedures. 98
94 The availability of rewards in return for specific testimony constitutes bribery in
the layman's usage of the term, if not according to statutory definition. See infra notes
145-48 and accompanying text.
95 732 F.2d at 1532.
96 See cases cited supra note 33.
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. After the federal courts' decisions in
Waterman and Dailey, some state courts have been more receptive to contingent plea
agreements. In State v. O'Connor, 378 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (S.D. 1985) (plurality opin-
ion), for example, the South Dakota Supreme Court assessed a plea agreement that was
contingent upon the recovery of stolen property and the arrest of co-conspirators. In
upholding the constitutionality of the agreement the court cited Waterman and Dailey and
stated:
Contingent plea agreements should be reserved for the very excep-
tional cases. They cannot be contingent upon the return of an indictment
or a guilty verdict. In the rare exceptional cases where the value and the
extent of the accomplice's knowledge is uncertain, but likely to be very
great, and there is full disclosure to the jury, a constitutional violation
does not occur. In this case, the O'Connor plea agreement involved
truthful testimony of a co-conspirator and other witnesses leading to the
arrest. Although we do not approve of these types of contingent plea
agreements, in this case it is not a violation of due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment. The jury was fully aware of the plea agreement
and O'Connor had a full and complete opportunity to cross-examine the
benefactor of that agreement.
Id. at 252 (citations omitted).
98 The Court's concern with fairness at trial has increased as society's concern has
increased. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which overruled Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), illustrates this trend. In holding that indigent defendants must be
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3. Desirability of a Per Se Rule
The Supreme Court has applied a case-by-case analysis of some
trial procedures where the procedures in question were reliable and
necessary under the circumstances.9 9 This reasoning, however does
not apply fully to contingent agreements. Contingent agreements
are never necessary to obtain accomplice testimony because tradi-
tional plea agreements of leniency in return for truthful testimony
already serve the government's purpose of obtaining testimony.
Traditional agreements allow the prosecution to scrutinize the truth
of the testimony and withhold the benefits of the agreement if the
witness fails to disclose the full truth. Contingent agreements only
add the threat to the witness that telling the truth alone may not
result in collecting the bargained-for benefits. Furthermore, per se
rules deter misconduct more forcefully than a case-by-case analysis
of the circumstances. 100 Thus, contingent agreements are unneces-
sary and merit a per se prohibition.
4. Administrative Costs
Courts have offered several administrative justifications for con-
tingent accomplice plea agreements. First, a prosecutor may not
know the extent of a witness's knowledge and therefore has an inter-
est in negotiating an agreement that places a premium on full and
complete testimony. 1 1 Second, some accomplice witnesses who are
trying to escape punishment 10 2 or fear reprisals from the defendant
have no incentive to testify truthfully, especially if they lied under
oath before.' 0 3 Third, a prosecutor reluctant to bargain with an ac-
complice may want to condition the bargain upon concrete results
to ensure that the government reaps some benefit from its
leniency. ' 0 4
Prosecutors do not need to use contingent plea agreements to
achieve valid prosecutorial objectives, however, because traditional
plea agreements already perform such functions. Under the first
appointed counsel in felony cases, the Gideon Court agreed that Belts was "an anachro-
nism when handed down." 372 U.S. at 345. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), also
highlights changed attitudes toward the criminal justice process. By overruling Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), Bloom rejected the historical acceptance of federal
courts' power to punish for criminal contempt without an indictment or a jury trial.
99 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
100 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199 (1972) ("The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive
confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure where a
more reliable one may be available .... ").
1O1 Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197; O'Connor, 378 N.W.2d at 252 (plurality opinion).
102 E.g., Kimble, 719 F.2d at 1255.
103 See, e.g., id.
104 E.g., Waterman, 732 F.2d at 1533; Baresh, 595 F. Supp. at 1137.
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justification where the prosecutor seeks complete information, the
contingent agreement elicits no more testimony than the standard
plea bargain. Because the prosecution does not know the extent of
a witness's knowledge, the prosecutor must make a subjective deci-
sion whether to confer or withhold the benefits of the bargain. Even
if the witness fails to reveal information, the prosecutor might still
grant the full bargained-for leniency because he was unaware of the
deficiency. These kinds of judgments are often the basis of tradi-
tional bargains. If the prosecution finds that the witness is not re-
vealing the whole truth, the court can release the government from
its promises under the agreement.1 05
As to the second justification, similar reasoning applies. The
government may withhold the benefits of the agreement if it finds
that the witness has not told the truth. The conditions of the bar-
gain will not affect the government's ability to distinguish perjury
from fact.
The third justification is indefensible because prosecutors have
a duty to seek the truth, not merely convictions.1 06 That duty "ex-
tends not only to marshalling and presenting evidence to obtain a
conviction, but also to protecting the court and the accused from
having a conviction result from misleading evidence or perjured
testimony." 07
Traditional plea bargains adequately achieve any administrative
interest served by making plea bargains contingent. The prosecu-
tion has the same power in both cases to deny the benefits of the
bargain if the accomplice fails to reveal the full truth, and the same
impotence in discerning whether the witness is withholding infor-
mation. Further, a traditional plea bargain restricts the defendant's
fundamental right to a fair trial less than a contingent plea bargain
because it does not needlessly encourage perjury.
The prohibition of contingent plea agreements should have a
negligible effect upon the efficient administration of the judicial sys-
tem. Although excluding testimony made pursuant to reward-in-
duced agreements initially may deny the introduction of important
evidence, prosecutors quickly will revert to traditional plea bargains.
When prosecutors realize that contingent agreements fail judicial
scrutiny, they will prefer to bargain within the limits of fairness
rather than risk the testimony's exclusion.' 08
105 United States v. Swinehart, 614 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827
(1980); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976).
106 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); A.B.A., supra note 8, § 1.1(c).
107 DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 396, 494 P.2d 589, 593 (1972).
108 In civil cases the Supreme Court has developed a clearer, more overtly utilitarian
standard for weighing procedural due process questions than it has applied in criminal
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B. Other Approaches
Even if courts do not hold contingent plea agreements uncon-
stitutional, they may exercise their supervisory powers to exclude
testimony obtained pursuant to such agreements. Inherent supervi-
sory powers enable judges to control the rules of their courts in or-
der to achieve acceptable maximum levels of accuracy in admitted
evidence. Prosecutorial misconduct and undue prejudice to the de-
fendant may also merit the exclusion of certain evidence.
cases. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), the Court set forth the
following test:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Some scholars suggest that this utilitarian civil law due process standard, along with
an analysis of fairness, should apply to criminal due process cases because the civil stan-
da'rd more directly weighs the benefits of the procedures against their societal costs.
Professor Nowak, for example, pinpointed Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), in
which the Supreme Court determined that indigent defendants may be denied ap-
pointed counsel if the potential punishment does not include imprisonment, as a crimi-
nal case in which the civil law standard should have been applied:
Even if the Court were to find the sixth amendment irrelevant [in deter-
mining whether an indigent should have the right to counsel where no
incarceration could be imposed], it should have examined due process
values. Were this a civil case where a party was asking for some proce-
dural safeguard, the Court, employing the Mathews balancing test, would
have examined the worth of the safeguard to the individual and its value
in insuring a reliable fact determination.... The Scott majority engaged
in no such analysis. Use of the suggested due process methodology
model would have required the Court to examine the value in a fair crimi-
nal process to both the individual and society, the chance that individual
rights were endangered by the absence of counsel, and the societal worth
of having the added assurance of systemic fairness and equality of treat-
ment in the adversary process.
Nowak, Criminal Law: Foreword-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 408 (1979) (footnote omitted).
Contingent plea bargains fail the Mathews civil procedural due process test. Mathews
requires that the judge weigh the defendant's interest in a trial on reliable evidence and
the risk of deprivation of that interest against the value to and burdens on the state of
using alternative procedures.
The Supreme Court has stated that admissible evidence must have certain indicia of
reliability. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. Because contingent agree-
ments encourage biased or perjured testimony, a clear danger exists that these agree-
ments will lead to violating the defendant's due process rights. Substituting traditional
plea agreements for contingent agreements and excluding testimony tainted by contin-
gent agreements greatly promotes the processes of a fair trial at no cost to the govern-
ment. The use of the Mathews balancing test therefore demonstrates that contingent
plea agreements violate the civil due process standards advocated by Professor Nowak
for use in criminal cases.
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1. Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
Exclusionary rules prohibit prosecutors from using evidence
obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth,10 9 fifth,"10 and
sixth111 amendment rights. The Constitution does not compel the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's rights;
rather, the Supreme Court has held that the courts should employ
exclusionary rules to deter official misconduct and promote accu-
racy. The common reference to the term "exclusionary rule" in
fourth amendment cases is unfortunate because this usage tends to
divert discussion from other contexts that require exclusion. 12 Ex-
clusions based on an effort to promote fair trials are designed to
further an interest in accuracy1 13 and thus are distinguishable from
most other exclusions, such as the fourth amendment exclusions,
which aim to deter unconstitutional governmental conduct.1 14
In Williamson v. United States115 the Fifth Circuit barred admis-
sion of an informer's testimony in an effort to maintain a standard of
reliability. The court found the informer's testimony untrustworthy
because a contingent fee arrangement induced the informer to
purchase illicit whiskey from the suspects in return for a specified
fee for each seller caught. The court declared that such agreements
render the ensuing evidence inadmissible because the arrangement
tends to "frame up" the defendant and eliminates the possibility of
a fair trial. 116 The court noted that "it becomes the duty of the
courts in federal criminal cases to require fair and lawful conduct
from federal agents in the furnishing of evidence of crimes." 117
In both contingent fee arrangements and contingent plea
agreements, prosecutors reward one who testifies against the de-
fendant. 118 Contingent plea agreements, however, involve much
higher stakes; a reduction of a jail sentence by several years is far
109 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of
fourth amendment excluded from state trial); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) (evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment excluded from federal trial).
110 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination secured).
111 See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (statements obtained
in violation of right to counsel excluded).
112 "Whether exclusion is or should be required in these contexts presents issues
significantly different but no less important than those in the Fourth Amendment con-
text." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 164, at 445.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 24-32; infra text accompanying note 120.
114 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
115 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
116 Id. at 444.
117 Id.
118 Baresh, 595 F. Supp. at 1136 (reversal required only when 'specific defendant
was picked out for the informer's efforts by a government agent'" (quoting United
States v. Lane, 693 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1982))).
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more valuable than a few hundred dollars. These heightened stakes
increase the likelihood that the bargain will heavily influence the
content of the testimony. In accordance with the Williamson rule,
courts should exclude evidence obtained pursuant to contingent
plea agreements because these agreements encourage perjury and
courts have a duty to require "fair and lawful conduct" from govern-
mental representatives. As one state court noted, "J]ustice is not
served where the prosecutor must simultaneously purchase and co-
erce testimony in order to obtain a conviction which might not be
achieved with trustworthy evidence."1 19
Courts employ other exclusionary rules when limiting instruc-
tions cannot sufficiently diminish a jury's estimation of the evi-
dence's credibility. Such prominent exclusionary rules as the
hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the rules excluding bad character as
evidence of a crime, and the original documents ("best evidence")
rule have the elucidation of truth as their common purpose.1 20 The
exclusion of evidence at trial constitutes the last effective legal con-
trol over the introduction of unreliable evidence. Courts must assert
such control because the evidence, regardless of its reliability, will
sway the jury. Limiting instructions as to the diminished weight that
the jury should give unreliable evidence often have little effect.1 21
Some courts argue that because prosecutors must reveal the
conditions of plea bargains at trial,122 juries can accurately weigh
and discount the credibility of witnesses testifying under contingent
agreements. 123 Although courts widely accept this reasoning as ap-
plicable to ordinary plea bargains,124 such reasoning lacks force with
contingent plea agreements. Traditional agreements involve
straightforward exchanges which juries can competently evaluate.
Under an ordinary agreement, a witness lies mainly to downplay his
119 Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 225, 577 P.2d 860, 863 (1978).
120 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 72, at 170-71. Admittance of hearsay without
certain "indicia of reliability" violates the defendant's right to confrontation and due
process. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721
(1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
121 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977) (juries are often unduly recep-
tive to untrustworthy evidence); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 59, at 152 (juries
may use evidence for improper purpose despite limiting instructions). See Lind, The Psy-
chology of Courtroom Procedure (citing psychological studies that question jurors' obedience
to instructions), in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13, 29-31 (N. Kerr & R. Bray
eds. 1982).
122 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
123 Fallon, 776 F.2d at 734; Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200; Kimble, 719 F.2d at 1257;
O'Connor, 378 N.W.2d at 252 (plurality opinion).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 738 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.) (credibility of informer's
testimony hoping to avoid jail term question for jury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869 (1984);
United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.) (mere fact that witness may receive
reduced sentence does not disqualify testimony; jury knows witness pleaded guilty and is
awaiting sentence), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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own culpability. Because jurors come across self-exculpatory con-
duct in their daily lives, they can readily understand this motivation
and discount the credibility of the testimony accordingly. Under
contingent agreements, the witness aims not to exculpate himself,
but to incriminate the defendant. Jurors likely have more difficulty
quantifying the force of this motivation. Moreover, agreements
contingent upon the prosecution's satisfaction or the outcome of
the case pressure witnesses in an unpredictable manner. Witnesses
will assess differently the testimony necessary to satisfy the prosecu-
tor; although some will testify truthfully, others will embellish their
testimony to varying degrees to ensure prosecutorial favor. Neither
judge nor jury can assess accurately the subjective nature of the im-
pact and ascertain the extent to which the terms of the agreement
have altered the content of the testimony.125 This element of uncer-
tainty frustrates the jury's duty to judge the witness's credibility be-
cause the government has complicated the credibility issue by
imposing external constraints upon the witness's testimony. 126
Paradoxically, the more profound the impact of the agreement,
the more problems the jury will have in assessing its impact. The
greater the witness's stake in the prosecution's success, the less an
exhaustive cross-examination will reveal. When the witness's future
depends upon the recounting of persuasive testimony, he will for-
mulate a logical and consistent story. 127 Furthermore, the witness
125 Contingent agreements might also affect a witness's testimony in the same way
that hypnosis affects testimony. A growing majority of states will not admit posthypnotic
testimony because during hypnosis the subject may subconsciously invent details to
please the hypnotist. Later the subject becomes certain of the accuracy of his memory
and will testify with conviction. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201-04 (5th
Cir. 1984) (posthypnotic testimony excluded because it is so unreliable that it violates
due process and the right to confrontation); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d
1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (discussion of hypnotic memory as constructive rather than
reproductive), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). As with a participant of hypnotic induc-
tion, the memory of a witness subject to a contingent agreement may be affected by the
strong desire to please the prosecutor. This impact upon perception and memory may
further insulate the witness's testimony from effective cross-examination.
126 Rex v. Robinson, 30 B.C.R. 369, 376 (1921) ("It is this element of uncertainty
and the impossibility of determining the extent of it that makes this case so peculiar and
unsatisfactory, and it cannot properly, in my opinion, be viewed as a question of credi-
bility for the jury but one of frustration of their right to pass upon credibility.").
127 It is obvious that if the witness did get the impression from the Court
that unless he told the same story to the Court as he did to the police, he
would be executed, then his testimony was tainted beyond redemption
and could not, in a legal sense, be weighed by the jury, because the wit-
ness was no longer a free agent and there was no standard by which his
veracity could be tested or estimated. This is not merely a matter going
to the credibility of the witness, but something fundamentally deeper,
viz., that by action of the Court itself the witness was fettered in his testi-
mony and put in so dire a position that the value of his evidence was not
capable of appraisement ....
Id. at 375-76.
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probably will adhere to any previous untrue statements with perse-
verance. Thus, admission of such testimony is potentially more
prejudicial than probative.
By eliminating the effectiveness of cross-examination in deter-
mining the truth, the government extinguishes any opportunity to
develop accomplice testimony favorable to the defendant. 128 The
lack of effective cross-examination renders testimony "impure, du-
bious and 'tainted beyond redemption.' "129 Courts must exclude
such testimony because they cannot determine whether the prosecu-
tion would have offered the same evidence absent the government's
use of contingent plea agreements.
2. Supervisory Powers: The Duty to Maintain Standards of
Procedure and Prejudice
Judges have the inherent power to control the procedures and
rules of their courts. The Supreme Court has approved the exercise
of supervisory powers to suppress evidence improperly obtained by
the government.'3 0 This inherent supervisory role "implies the
128 As noted in Brief of Appellee at 45, United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st
Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1578), a parallel can be drawn between the exclusion of testimony
resulting from contingent plea bargains and the exclusion of witness testimony about
some thing destroyed by the government before the defendant had an opportunity to
examine or analyze it. See United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1976) (trial
judge erred in refusing to strike testimony of Drug Enforcement Administration agent,
whose diary of events was destroyed in violation of federal law). Where the prosecution
is responsible for the destruction of evidence possibly favorable to the defendant, and
the destruction renders any cross-examination fruitless, courts should not allow the
prosecution to use that evidence for its own purposes in court.
129 People v. Green, 102 Cal. App. 2d 831, 839, 228 P.2d 867, 872 (1951) (quoting
Robinson, 30 B.C.R. at 375).
Because the defendant exercises his sixth amendment right to confrontation of the
prosecution's witnesses primarily through cross-examination, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 315 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965), contingent agreements
raise confrontation clause concerns. When an agreement constrains a witness to testify
in a certain manner, it limits relevant inquiries into guilt or innocence. Substantial limi-
tations upon relevant cross-examination violate the defendant's right to question ad-
verse witnesses. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1984)
(posthypnotic testimony possibly violates sixth amendment confrontation clause be-
cause it renders cross-examination ineffective); Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Proce-
dure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-84, 73 GEO. LJ. 249, 657-67
(1984) (sixth amendment rights are violated if right to cross-examination has been irrep-
arably prejudiced). Consequently, the defendant is denied his fundamental right to a fair
trial. People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438,450, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 141 (1974) (under
contingent immunity arrangement, defendants were denied "any effective cross-exami-
nation" and were "deprived of the fundamental right to a fair trial"); Franklin v. State,
94 Nev. 220, 223, 577 P.2d 860, 862 (1978) (agreeing with Medina rationale).
130 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (whether evidence
was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers is question of fed-
eral law in which federal court must make independent inquiry); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943) (court may formulate rules of evidence to apply in
federal criminal prosecution beyond those provided in Constitution).
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duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of proce-
dure and evidence."1 3 1 The Supreme Court has stated:
[F]ederal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not
specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress. The
purposes underlying use of the supervisory powers are threefold:
to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights; to pre-
serve judicial integrity... ; and finally, as a remedy designed to
deter illegal conduct. 132
Because prosecutors have broad discretion in the formation of
plea agreements, 3 3 judges must protect defendants from
prosecutorial misconduct. Courts have invoked their supervisory
powers to require fair governmental conduct at trial134 and have re-
versed lower courts if the misconduct prejudicially affected the de-
fendant's substantive rights.' 35 Allowing the prosecution to use the
plea bargaining process to coerce a witness into testifying in a par-
ticular fashion prejudices the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The reasoning behind the fourth amendment exclusionary
rules offers an illustration of the exercise of courts' supervisory
powers. Under the fourth amendment, all exclusions are justified
on at least one of two grounds: deterrence of future illegal or un-
constitutional conduct 36 or preservation of the integrity of the judi-
cial system. 137
Excluding testimony made pursuant to contingent agreements
should provide a strong deterrent to prosecutorial overreaching.
Once the parameters of prosecutorial discretion are clear, prosecu-
tors will not make contingent arrangements for fear that courts will
exclude important testimony.
Excluding testimony made pursuant to a contingent agreement
131 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340.
132 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (citations omitted).
133 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
134 See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30-31 (1957) (conviction reversed because
prosecutor knew but did not disclose that witness was testifying falsely); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (conviction reversed because suspect not timely
brought before magistrate or warned that he had right to counsel or right to remain
silent); cf United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.) (accomplice plea
agreement was not contingent upon government satisfaction with testimony and there-
fore did not require exercise of supervisory powers in excluding testimony), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 939 (1976).
135 United States v. Brown, 720 F.2d 1059, 1072-75 (9th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor's
reference to witness's polygraph test constituted impermissible vouching of witness's
credibility and "'more probabl[y] than not ... materially affected the verdict[s],'" re-
quiring new trial (quoting United States v. Mouton, 617 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980))).
136 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217,
222 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
137 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23; Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914).
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will improve the accuracy and integrity of the fact-finding process.
Preserving the integrity of the judicial system requires appropriate
limitations upon prosecutorial discretion.1 38 Allowing prosecutors
to encourage perjury in return for lenient sentences diminishes pub-
lic respect for the criminal justice system.13 9 By enforcing contin-
gent plea bargains, courts sanction the prosecutor's power to
persuade an accomplice to disregard his oath of truthfulness in or-
der to obtain penal leniency. This use of the bargaining process by
the prosecution perverts the truth-seeking purpose of the judicial
system.
Courts also have the power to exclude evidence that creates a
substantial danger of undue prejudice.1 40 In this context, undue
prejudice means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper ba-
sis.141 Ajudge should weigh the probable effectiveness of a limiting
instruction before making the exclusionary decision. 142 Regardless
of limiting instructions, however, admittance of evidence made pur-
suant to reward-induced agreements creates a great risk of unfair
prejudice because the jury most likely will give the testimony greater
weight than it merits.143 Even if the judge directs the jury to give
138 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307 (1971); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
139 Not only were notorious criminals escaping substantial punishment after
long and arduous government efforts to put them behind bars, but sub-
stantial harm was being done to the truth-seeking process, which is sup-
posed to be one of the principal aims of the criminal justice system.
Convicted criminals were being used to breed other criminal convictions,
with none of the criminals receiving substantial punishment as long as
they could contribute to enlarging the "body count." (The body count
here, of course, is at least as misleading as that provided by General Wil-
liam Westmoreland's staff in Vietnam, since the bodies are not really
down and out after conviction. They rise from their ashes as federal
witnesses.)
Silvergate, Brief Cases, Boston Phoenix, Sept. 3, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (criticizing First Cir-
cuit's reversal of district court's decision in Dailey; see supra text accompanying notes 61-
75).
140 Case law explicitly recognizes that a judge has great discretion in controlling the
admission of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 1264, 1266 (5th Cir.
1977) ("trial court's ruling on relevancy and materiality of evidence will not be disturbed
absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion"). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 codi-
fies this power: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." See also UNIF. R. EVID. 45 ("Except as in these
rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds
that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will...
b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of mislead-
ing the jury .... ).
141 FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
142 See FED. R. EVID. 105.
143 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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less weight to certain evidence, these limiting instructions cannot
diminish the testimony's initial impression upon the jury.
3. Contingent Agreements and the Bribery of Witnesses
One bribes a witness to induce him to change his testimony.
Although prosecutors may enter into contingent agreements with-
out a corrupt purpose, therefore avoiding the statutory definition of
bribery, 144 these agreements induce witnesses to testify in a certain
manner regardless of the truth. Like bribed testimony, testimony
made under contingent agreements is extremely unreliable.
Congress prohibits the bribery of witnesses and the acceptance
of bribes in 18 U.S.C. § 201.14 5 A person commits bribery by cor-
ruptly giving or promising to give anything of value to a witness in
return for favorable testimony. Although prosecutors probably do
not arrange contingent plea agreements with corrupt intent, they
negotiate those bargains, by definition, with the intent to obtain par-
ticular testimony. Because prosecutors already have the ability to
obtain truthful testimony through traditional plea bargains, contin-
gent agreements can only serve the purpose of eliciting particular
testimony which the prosecutor wants to introduce at trial. The ob-
vious danger of this practice is that the prosecutor ignores the prin-
ciple that all persons are assumed innocent until proven guilty and
instead usurps the jury's role of determining guilt."4 6
The witness's awareness of the prosecutor's wishes influences
the testimony of that witness; therefore, the contingent agreement
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. Congress drafted 18
U.S.C. § 201 to enhance the veracity of in-court testimony. In con-
trast, contingent plea agreements reduce the veracity of witnesses
144 See infra note 145.
145 Bribery of public officials and witnesses
(d) Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any person .... with intent to influence the
testimony under oath or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a
witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court.., or
(e) Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts,
solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value...
in return for being influenced in his testimony under oath or affirmation
as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding...
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for
not more than fifteen years, or both .....
18 U.S.C. § 201(d), (e) (1982).
146 See Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 223 n.2, 577 P.2d 860, 861 n.2 (1978) ("IT]his
case demonstrates the potential for injustice which is inherent in selling an admitted
felon leniency, in order to buy testimony against another person whom the Constitution
presumes innocent, but who nonetheless has been tried and found guilty in the prosecu-
tor's mind.").
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by encouraging perjury. The government hinders the principal
truth-seeking aim of the statute by using contingent plea bargaining
as a prosecutorial tool.
The American Bar Association Standards address the bribery of
witnesses by stating that it is unprofessional conduct for an attorney
to compensate a witness, other than an expert, for giving testi-
mony. 147 The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically pro-
hibits contingent payments:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of
compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his tes-
timony or the outcome of the case.148
Contingent plea bargains are, in effect, bribes passing from the
government to accomplices in return for specific testimony under
oath. Defendants lack comparable leverage in obtaining favorable
witnesses and are therefore at a strong disadvantage at the trial's
outset. Judicial tolerance of these agreements obstructs legislative
intent as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 201 and inhibits the search for
truth.
CONCLUSION
Courts must prohibit contingent agreements between accom-
plices and prosecutors. Plea bargains conditioned upon indictment,
conviction, or prosecutorial satisfaction with testimony encourage
perjury. The admission of such unreliable testimony violates the
due process right of the defendant to a fair trial and cannot be justi-
fied on the grounds of historical acceptance or administrative effi-
ciency. Furthermore, judicial refusal to strike down contingent
agreements pursuant to the court's inherent supervisory powers re-
sults in the admission of prejudicial evidence and allows the prose-
cutor to make a mockery of the truth-seeking function of the
criminal justice system.
Yvette A. Beeman
147 The A.B.A. Standards state: "(a) It is unprofessional conduct to compensate a
witness, other than an expert, for giving testimony, but it is not improper to reimburse
an ordinary witness for the reasonable expenses of attendance upon court .. " A.B.A.,
supra note 8, § 3.2(a).
148 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-109(C) (1980).
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